Category Archives: Dmitry Medvedev

Post-summit Moscow report: Business as usual

In my Weekly Standard article before Obama’s trip, I said that the most likely outcome would be “business as usual.”  And, evidently, so it is.

The latest news:

Russia will not agree to tougher sanctions against Iran over its nuclear program in exchange for a new nuclear arms cuts deal with Washington, Interfax news agency quoted a foreign ministry source as saying Tuesday.

A Kremlin source told Reuters that the exchange of remarks over START and Iran did not indicate any change in the overall atmosphere of Russia-U.S. contacts.

Pretty much the textbook definition of business as usual.

In other, little-reported news, Medvedev reiterated right after the summit that Russia still plans to deploy (not-yet-existent) missiles in Kaliningrad if the U.S. goes ahead with the missile shield installations in Poland and the Czech Republic (plans that remain intact, though still under review for effectiveness, according to a July 10 briefing by Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs Philip J. Crowley; see the video here at 13:26).

Of course, this renewed crude saber-rattling actually makes it harder for Obama administration to scrap those sites if the review finds them less than effective, because then Obama will be seen as giving in to Russian blackmail.  Of course, it’s entirely possible that the Kremlin junta, with its “foreign policy” of tantrums and grievances, would much rather have those missile defense installations in place and be able to scream about being threatened and disrespected by the Americans.

So much for the beginning of a beautiful friendship.

(Cross-posted to

Leave a comment

Filed under Dmitry Medvedev, Russia, Russian-American relations

Obama Moscow update


So, there’s an agreement on nuclear weapons cuts.  Is that such a step of major importance today, when the once-terrifying prospect of all-out nuclear war between the Soviet Union and the United States is of far less concern in the public mind (and rightly so, I think) than a stray North Korean or Iranian missile?  Since the fall of Communism, disarmament has become a ritualistic ballet that mainly flatters the Russian ego because it makes Russia feel like a fellow superpower.  (The cuts benefit Russia in other ways as well; its nuclear arsenal is badly in need of an upgrade, and the country can ill afford a new arms race.)   Has Obama agreed to link stratetgic arms reductions to the issue of missile shield installations in Eastern Europe?  Obama says no (and his chief Russia advisor, Michael McFaul, says no even more emphatically); Medvedev seems to think he has, because discussions of “defensive weapons” are to be included in the talks.  There’s also a statement about “cooperation” on missile defense.  Whether any of this is meaningful remains to be seen.  Russian policy expert Dmitry Trenin of the Carnegie Moscow Center writes that the way out of the impasse is for the U.S. to agree to a joint missile defense with Russia, a decicion from which Trenin says “the U.S. has little to lose” even if it ultimately doesn’t work out.  The problem is that, as Trenin admits, Moscow does not want a joint ABM defense system if the U.S. also proceeds with missile shield installations in Eastern Europe.  Dead end.

There is a deal to allow the transit of U.S. weapons and military personnel across Russian territory (and airspace) to Afghanistan to help the U.S. and NATO military effort there.  As Russian military analyst Alexander Golts notes (Russian-language link), “While Moscow presented this as a concession, in reality it is obvious that the Americans’ war effort in Afghanistan ensures Russia’s security.”   Golts believes that this deal was the only useful part of the Obama-Medvedev talks, otherwise no more meaningful than (in his colorful metaphor) the chatter of extras on a movie set who must maintain the background noise of conversation.

There was, however, an interesting reference to Georgia. Continue reading

1 Comment

Filed under Barack Obama, Dmitry Medvedev, foreign policy, Russia, Russian-American relations, Vladimir Putin

Mr. Obama goes to Moscow

My new column examines Obama’s upcoming trip and the debate between “realists” and “idealists” on Russia.

(And my other column today, in The Wall Street Journal, asks if Mr. Putin is going to Georgia.  Again.)

The Obama visit should be interesting.  Evidently, Obama is spending a lot of one-on-one time with Medvedev (who declares on his video blog today that “Today, we are united by the values of our civilization, the values of respect for human life and human rights and freedoms” — does he say this stuff with a straight face?) and a lot of time with “unofficial” activists.  On Tuesday, he breakfasts with Putin.  Obama’s remarks today suggest that his “narrative” for the Moscow trip is that he and Medvedev together will be leading their countries forward to cooperation and partnership, while Putin, who “still has a lot of sway” and keeps “one foot in the old ways of doing business”, needs to understand that the time of the old ways has passed.  Sounds like Obama’s message to Putin is, more or less, “Move out of the way, buddy, time’s up.”

Chances are, Putin is not going to like this, particularly in conjunction with the fact that Obama goes straight from breakfast with Putin to a day of meetings with representatives of unofficial Russia.  In, Alexander Golts writes that his conversations with “certain people who are involved in the [U.S.-Russian] negotiations in one way or another” have left with the impression that they are confident that Obama’s visit will be productive, but also extremely tense and nervous that something will go wrong.  And that “something” has a name.  According to Golts,

At one point, an impressively high-level diplomat blurted out, “What if Putin finally loses it completely and screws everything up?”

I go back and forth on how real or meaningful the rumored Putin-Medvedev rift really is, and to what extent Medvedev is really emerging as his own man (or a reformer).   We may learn a lot next week.

1 Comment

Filed under Barack Obama, Dmitry Medvedev, Russia, US foreign policy, Vladimir Putin

Authoritarians of the world, unite: You have nothing to lose but your rigged elections

My landslide is bigger than yours!

My landslide is bigger than yours!

So, Russia is resisting G-8 condemnation of the Iranian government’s handling of the election and the post-election process.

What a surprise.

According to Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, “”No one is willing to condemn the election process, because it’s an exercise in democracy.”

And, compared to Russia, it was!  There was a viable opposition candidate who was allowed not only to get on the ballot, but to campaign, have access to the media and participate in televised debates.  That’s a far cry from the Three Stooges who “ran” against Medvedev in 2008 — and who debated each other, with Medvedev conspicuously absent.  Medvedev had the bigger landslide, 71% to Ahmadinejad’s 62% — but the latter figure is suspiciously similar to United Russia’s 65% win in the December  2007 elections.  The new formula for authoritarian regimes seems to be somewhere around two-thirds of the vote for the ruling party or its candidate.  Soviet-style figures of 99% won’t do for a “democracy,” even a “sovereign” one; on the other hand, two-thirds demonstrates that a convincing majority of the population backs the ruling party.


Filed under Dmitry Medvedev, Iran, Russia

New Russia article: Barack Obama’s Moscow trip and U.S.-Russian relations

In anticipation of Barack Obama’s Moscow trip, my new article on U.S.-Russian relations runs in The Weekly Standard.


Today, more than a year into the Medvedev presidency, it is obvious that there has been no change of course at the Kremlin. The extent of Medvedev’s true authority remains unclear, and Putin is still a figure to contend with. While Medvedev may seem more sympathetic to domestic liberalism–he doesn’t, for instance, share his patron’s open, visceral aversion to journalists and activists critical of the state–his rhetoric on foreign affairs has been no less aggressive than Putin’s. Any “reset,” then, would have to be based on a change in American policy.

Indeed, most American critics of the “new Cold War”–on both the left at the Nation and the paleocon right at the American Conservative–share the belief that the recent chill between the United States and Russia was caused primarily by American arrogance and insensitivity. In this view, Russia extended a hand of friendship to the United States after September 11 only to be repaid with repeated slaps in the face: the Bush administration’s withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 2002, NATO expansion into Eastern Europe and the former USSR, support for regime change in ex-Soviet republics (particularly the 2004 “Orange Revolution” in Ukraine), and plans for a missile shield that Russians fear is directed mostly at them. Supporters of a “fresh start” undoubtedly hope Obama’s Moscow trip will include apologies for at least some of these perceived wrongs.

The perception, however, is quite tendentious.

Continue reading


Filed under Dmitry Medvedev, Russia, Russian-American relations, US foreign policy

More Kremlin follies: Russia vs. Georgia, redux?

Today’s New York Times has a harsh editorial castigating Moscow’s latest exercise in stupid self-assertion:

In a depressing sequel to its petty and destructive war against Georgia last summer, Russia has now cast a petty and destructive veto in the United Nations Security Council, compelling the abrupt withdrawal of 130 badly needed international military monitors from Georgia’s secessionist region of Abkhazia.

It was petty because Russia’s larger interest lies in calming, not stirring up, secessionist ambitions in the Caucasus, a violently fractured part of the world that includes other restive regions like Chechnya. And it was destructive because whatever hopes the Russian-backed Abkhazian separatists might still retain for a semblance of international legitimacy vanishes with the withdrawal of the United Nations mission.


Moscow’s heavy-handed meddling has isolated Abkhazia, and Russia. Only Russia and Nicaragua recognized the “independence” Abkhazia proclaimed after the Russian incursion last summer. This month Russia voted alone in the Security Council to evict the monitors.

They could have added that Russia suffered an embarrassing setback in its quest for recognition for Abkhazia and South Ossetia when former pal Alexander Lukashenko of Belarus took the first half a $500 million loan that was a tacit bribe for recognition, and then didn’t come through.

The Times is quite right that further destabilization and growth of separatism in the region would be detrimental to Russia more than anyone else; hardly a day goes by without deadly violence, including assassinations of high-level officials and military officers, in places like Ingushetia and Dagestan.   But of course, for the Kremlin leadership, muscle-flexing and ego-tripping counts for a lot more than such practical considerations.

Meanwhile, Russia is planning large-scale military exercises near the Georgian border; not only will these exercises take place in “independent” Abkhazia and South Ossetia, but they are pretty clearly directed at Georgia — at the very least, to send a signal.  Adrian Piontkovsky, writing on (Russian text), speculates that Russia may be preparing for Georgian War II.

Continue reading

1 Comment

Filed under Dmitry Medvedev, Russia, Russia-Georgia conflict, Vladimir Putin, War

The Medvedev anniversary

Today marks Dmitry Medvedev’s first year in office.  But is he  President Medvedev or “President” Medvedev?  Is there a harmonious “tandem” or a Putin/Medvedev rift?


Which way?

Which way?



I have a column on his tenure so far at  My conclusion:

So far, the difference between Medvedev and Putin is mainly a matter of style and tone. Will style become substance? Could Medvedev be a genuine reformer who must tread carefully because he is still hobbled by the presence of Putin and his faction? Is he an ambitious man who wants to free himself from his mentor’s shadow, and prepare the ground for a second term, by using a mostly cosmetic liberalism to build a power base? Will the rumored discord in the Putin/Medvedev “tandem” become a full-scale war of Kremlin “clans”? Or is Medvedev playing “good cop” to Putin’s “bad cop,” primarily for Western consumption?

“Only time will tell” may be the tritest of conclusions. But in this case, it is the only one that seems fitting.


An interesting article on Medvedev’s liberal moves appeared in the “Russia Now” online supplement to The Daily Telegraph (UK), produced by Rossiyskaya Gazeta — the official publication of the Russian government.  In other words, this is what the Kremlin’s mouthpiece wants to tell an English-speaking audience.

Medvedev’s interview to Novaya Gazeta, in a rather stilted but readable translation, can be found on the newspaper’s English-language site.  And here is Medvedev’s LiveJournal (seriously).

For those who read in Russian, some good expert opinions on Medvedev’s first year and the “tandemocracy” are offered here.  For those who don’t read in Russian, here’s a translation of the most  interesting quote.

Continue reading

Leave a comment

Filed under Dmitry Medvedev, Russia, Vladimir Putin

Russia updates: Obama and Medvedev; Lev Ponomarev

First of all, my apologies (again) for the lack of blogging.  Work has kept me busy, and partly the problem is that I want to make a meaty post when I finally make one.  In the future, I’ll try to post at least brief updates, for the Cathy-watchers who are still out there.

Lots and lots of Russia news.  Obama and Medvedev meet in London, and declare the beginning of yet another beautiful friendship.  (Medvedev called Obama his “new comrade”; I’m waiting for a “Comrade Obama” spin from the “Obama is the Stalin of our day” crowd, even though the word has long been out of use in Russia in its communist sense.)  Obama is poised to go to Russia in July.  There will be a new round in the disarmament tango, which no longer has its Cold War-era urgency because no one seriously believes that Russia and the United States could ever lob missiles at each other.  The idea of missile defense cooperation sounds interesting, but it’s unclear what, if anything, the talks about NATO expansion have accomplished.  (It is worth noting that Alexander Vershbow, Obama’s pick for Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security — a position that includes responsibility for U.S. policy toward NATO and coordination of U.S. security policies relatied to the nations and international organizations of Europe, the Middle East and Africa — is not only the former U.S. ambassador to Russia but, judging by his comments last October, a strong proponent of NATO’s eastward expansion.)  And I’m not sure why there are all these expectations that a cooperative Russia could help solve the Iranian nukes problem.  As far as I can tell, Russia’s friendly relationship with Iran in the past few years has been rooted mainly in a common interest in flipping off Uncle Sam as publicly as possible.  If a U.S-friendly Russia tried to pressure Iran to scuttle its nuclear program, I don’t see what leverage it would have.  Sure, they could stop providing the technology, but it’s not as if Iran had no alternatives, particularly with North Korea around.

My own (long) recent take on U.S.-Russian relations is in the April issue of Reason.  In a nutshell, I remain convinced that no meaningful partnership can exist between the U.S. and Russia as long as the Russian leadership (and much of the public) either embraces or exploits the idea that Russia’s greatness and special destiny lies in juxtaposing itself to the West, that for Russia to become fully integrated into the community of Western nations would somehow be a humiliation or a defeat.  Over the past five years, the Kremlin, via the mass media, has whipped up anti-Western and especially anti-American paranoia to a degree that few Americans can imagine.  (On March 26, in an interview on the Ekho Moskvy radio station [link leads to Russian text], a leading pro-government media personality, Maksim Shevchenko — who hosts a political talk show on Channel One as well as several radio shows — said that American forces in Afghanistan were “perfectly positioned to strike at our Urals, our Central Asia, our Southern Siberia.”)  Until the Russian government decisively divorces itself from this toxic nonsense (which is also peddled by loyalist youth groups like Nashi), its cooperation will not be reliable.

And, despite some signs of liberalization in Russia, the overall picture remains pretty bleak.  Here is the latest: the violent attack on human rights activist Lev Ponomarev, the subject of my column in today’s Boston Globe.  It was clearly a political attack, and while I don’t believe the government was directly involved, it has most certainly contributed to the atmosphere in which this kind of violence flourishes with impunity.  Much to Obama’s credit, he brought up the incident in his meeting with Medvedev.  (My earlier column on Ponomarev can be found here.)

There’s a common view among American “realists” that we shouldn’t push Russia too hard on democracy and human rights, and instead focus on areas of international cooperation.  But in Russia, contempt for human rights and confrontational attitudes toward the West go hand in hand.  That’s something that I hope the Obama administration will remember.  Fortunately, Obama’s top Russia hand at the National Security Council, Michael McFaul, seems well aware of this fact.


Filed under Barack Obama, Dmitry Medvedev, human rights, Russia, Russian-American relations

Finally, a Putin-Medvedev rift?

The Washington Post reports that there may be trouble in the Kremlin’s two-tsar show.   The signs: Dmitry Medvedev has ordered the revision of a Vladimir Putin-backed bill expanding the definition of treason; has reportedly prevented the Putin-sought sacking of an official who couldn’t control the protests in Vladivostok; and has met with Dmitry Muratov, editor-in-chief of Novaya Gazeta, to express condolences on the murder of Novaya reporter Anastasia Baburova, shot dead along with human rights lawyer Stanivslav Markelov.  (At the meeting, Medvedev told Muratov, whose paper has been harshly and often scathingly critical of the Kremlin, that “no one has to like” Novaya Gazeta, but it’s great that it exists and criticizes the government.  This is in stark contrast to Putin’s attitude toward the 2006 murder of another Novaya Gazeta reporter, Anna Politkovskaya.)

In another interesting development, “one Russian official … said Putin and Medvedev recently decided that a note-taker should keep minutes of their discussions because ‘misunderstandings’ had arisen following past meetings.”  (Putin: “But Dima!  We agreed that you were just there for window-dressing and I’d still make all the decisions!”  Medvedev: “Actually, Vova, that’s now how I remember it.”)

And now, the latest news: (Russian-language link): Medvedev has appointed several sharp Putin critics to the President’s Council on Human Rights and Civil Society.

Continue reading

1 Comment

Filed under Dmitry Medvedev, Russia, Vladimir Putin

Moscow plays coy

So, Dmitry Medvedev and Barack Obama talk on the phone and agree that the U.S. and Russia need to do something about “stopping the drift in U.S.-Russian relations.”  According to the White House, “”The presidents agreed that, as they were both new leaders from a post-Cold War generation they have a unique opportunity to establish a fundamentally different kind of relationship between the two countries.”   Well, that’s nice, but age isn’t everything, and the suggestion that Obama and Medvedev — Putin’s appointed successor and Mini-Me — are two of a kind is a little iffy.  Still, the rhetoric is predictable.

Now, what about the practice?  Let’s see.  First, a leading Russian news agency reports that Russia is halting deployment of the Iskander missiles that were Medvedev’s post-election-day welcoming gift to Obama, as an “olive branch” in response to the Unew administration “not pushing ahead” with missile shield installation in Poland and the Czech Republic.  Then, the Kremlin doesn’t confirm the report and one anonymous official says it’s “pure fiction.”  And all this means… what?  Diplomacy á la Russe?

Of course, Russia’s “we’ll deploy short-range missiles on the Polish border if you go ahead with your missile interceptor systems” move was a blatantly stupid one in the first place, unless Russia wants the U.S. to go ahead with the missile shield deployment.  There was a widespread perception, even before the election, that Obama would not be as gung-ho about missile defense as Bush.  (Who’s right is another matter; while the bien pensant set often dismisses the idea of interceptors to defend against possible Iranian missiles as typical Bushian lunacy, NATO foreign ministers unanimously approved it last December.)  But after Medvedev’s threat, going back on the missile defense plan will make Obama look like he’s caving in to Russian missile-rattling.  The explicit linkage of the missile defense installations (which, even if directed at Russia, could at most neutralize 0.01% of Russia’s nuclear arsenal) and the Russian Iskanders will obviously make meaningful missile defense negotiations more difficult.  Whether Russia actually wants continued antagonism is anyone’s guess.

The amusing thing about the missile-rattling is that, so far, the Russians are rattling non-existent missiles.   Most experts believe they won’t have the industrial capacity to actually build and install them for years.  On, analyst Vladimir Tyomny notes (link in Russian) that “if it weren’t for Obama giving Russia a pretext for a supposedly peaceful initiative, the Ministry of Defense would have had to rack its brains trying to figure out how to deploy in front of the enemy something that we don’t have.”  Is the peace initiative on or off?  Will they deploy the phantom missiles or not?  Stay tuned!

(Cross-posted at


Filed under Barack Obama, Dmitry Medvedev, Russia